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On   29th November 2004 John Monckton was stabbed and murdered in his 
home.  His wife was also stabbed and was close to death but recovered, 
thanks to their 9 year old daughter who managed to call the police. Their 
murderers posed as delivery men, and after their arrest it soon became clear 
that they were both on statutory orders to the Probation Service. 
 
The murder received detailed coverage in the media, as did Hanson and 
White’s Court appearances. The gruesome nature of the murders and the 
victims status probably made the story newsworthy, but so did  
the Probation Services management of the two men. After their trial, conviction 
and sentence the Home Secretary announced that an independent review of 
the cases would be carried out by Her Majesties Inspectorate of Probation 
(HMIP). 
 
The report team was headed by Andrew Bridges and was published in 
February of this year (2006). It arrives at five main findings, and makes 
recommendations on each of them.  
• Firstly it found that the Probation Service was not “doing the job 
properly” to minimise the offender’s risk of harm, and enforce statutory 
orders properly.  
• Secondly, it found a lack of clarity about the assumption of lead 
responsibility for managing the cases.  
• Thirdly, it found that the Parole Boards decision to release Hanson was 
not revised in the light of his changed circumstances.  
• Fourthly it found that the quality of the Probation Services risk of harm 
work needed to be better; it criticised the lack of risk-related targets 
nationally, and the organisation of staff into specialist teams within the 
London Probation Area. This arrangement offered some advantages, 
but ultimately made for a fragmented experience of supervision, and 
localised the expertise in managing risk in one discrete area of the 
organisation.  
• Lastly it recommended that the Inspectorate be involved in 
“exceptional” Serious Further Offences, just as it had in this one – in 
doing so it acknowledges that such situations will arise from time to 
time. 
 
Damien Hanson was 23 at the time of the murder. His first criminal conviction 
for indecent assault was at the age of 12, and he then appeared regularly for 
offences of theft, violence and burglary until the age of 17 when he received a 
12 year sentence for attempted murder and conspiracy to rob. It was whilst on 
licence for this offence that he killed John Monckton.  
 
The Inspectorates report scrutinised the granting of Hanson’s parole, and the 
management of that licence, and found fault at all stages. Hanson’s first 
application was in 2003, when his Probation Officer supported release, citing 
the attitudinal change he had made from accredited programmes  whilst in 
custody,  Puzzlingly, a Risk of Ham assessment completed shortly after the 
PAR assessed him as an intermediate risk of harm, despite an OGRS score of 
91%. The timing of the full assessment is odd (too late too inform the PAR) as 
is the conclusion. The Parole Board were less accepting of his progress, and 
his application was turned down.  Throughout Hanson’s management by both 
the Parole Board and the LPA an over-reliance on dynamic factors and a 
relative disregard of static factors is criticised. 
 
Before his next parole application Hanson completed “CALM”   (an anger 
reduction programme) and again made good progress in understanding and 
controlling his anger. However here the Inspectorate report makes an 
extremely pertinent point for practice; Hanson’s past (and subsequent) 
offences were not committed when he lost control, rather he employed 
violence as a strategy to get what he wanted. Such instrumental violence is 
particularly difficult to work with, in contrast to expressive violence which 
occurs as a result of the offender’s emotional state.  Unhelpfully, his OASys 
was completed subsequent to the PAR, and its quality was poor (e.g. his 
stated risk was to known persons, and his sexual assault at the age of 12 was 
dismissed as a “one-off) One consequence of this assessment was that 
Hanson’s case was never referred to MAPPA. 
 
Parole was granted to Hanson from 27th August on the condition that he live at 
the Basildon Hostel, and refrain from entering the borough of Hammersmith 
and Fulham, where his previous victim lived.  The first problem arose when 
Basildon declined Hanson’s referral. The case manager responded by finding 
an alternative hostel run by a voluntary organisation in London without 
returning the matter to the Parole Board. Hanson’s licence was made out to 
“reside as directed”, and so his residence in Lambeth did not technically 
contravene any conditions, even if elsewhere the Parole Board had clearly 
stated their support for the Essex hostel. This strikes the reader as a practice 
that is easy to find fault with in hindsight, yet without which release of 
prisoners will be hindered (and as the report notes, the legality of stopping 
release on parole once granted is questionable). One of the most newsworthy 
errors was the instruction to report on release to an office in the very borough 
he was forbidden from entering. Whilst at the hostel Hanson’s supervision plan 
and the level of contact with his (new) supervisor were poor. In short the 
Inspectorate sums up Hanson’s management on release as “the opposite of 
good Offender Management”. He had been at the hostel some two months 
when John Monckton was killed. 
 
Elliott White’s criminal convictions started much later than Hanson’s, and were 
all drug related.  Between the ages of 20 and 23 he had received a prison 
sentence and a Community Rehabilitation Order for variously possessing and 
supplying heroin and cocaine. A Drug Treatment and Testing Order (DTTO) 
was imposed in August 2004 for breaching the CRO, and it was the 
management of this order that revealed a succession of errors and omissions.  
It got off to a bad start, given that the CRO had ended in breach 9 months in, 
and the breach had been left in limbo for several months (the inspectorate 
report notes a gap of four months when there was no contact between LPA 
and White).The report expresses the opinion that this mis-management would 
have led to White having had a “weak understanding” of supervision, and a 
“low regard for the importance of complying”. If the start of the DTTO was bad, 
its management was to get worse. There was no proper supervision plan, 
record keeping was poor, and communication was inadequate between case 
manager, programme provider and testing provider. Enforcement fell well 
short of national standards where there were missed appointments and where 
there should have been 32 drug tests, only 11 were noted on the file. 
 
The report gives a detailed analysis of the both individuals case management, 
but does also define organisational deficiencies. The structure of the LPA, with 
its four functional teams is deemed to have made discontinuities in 
management inevitable - upon release from custody Hanson was transferred 
to another case manager. The report also identifies the strain on the 
organisation due to under-staffing as pertinent. Hanson received no visits from 
his Home Probation Officer between his first Parole application and release 
(budget problems had lead to restrictions on prison visiting). Hanson’s case 
manager received insufficient supervision, but their SPO was managing two 
teams at the time. In White’s case the drug testing was arranged separately 
from his drug treatment, and the report paints a picture of complex and 
fragmented partnership arrangements that did not work in harmony or share 
information. it acknowledges that the administration of the DTTO and its 
information systems were inadequate. 
  
The Inspectorate uses the term “collective failure” to describe the flawed 
practice of all those involved in Hanson and White’s management, and 
acknowledges “considerable organisational constraints” The reaction to the 
Inspectorates report is shaped by the wider landscape. The Inspectorate’s 
report on the Monckton case has come at a time when there are a number of 
appalling crimes committed by offenders being supervised by the Probation 
Service. Cases such as Anthony Rice (who murdered whilst on Parole in 
Hampshire), the torture rape and murder of Mary-Anne Leneghan (all the 
perpetrators were on community sentences to LPA) and Robert Symons 
(murdered by a burglar on a community sentence to the LPA). Alan Travis of 
the Guardian (29th March) commented that “this cluster of high-profile 
probation failures is in danger of turning into a modern-day dangerous dogs 
crisis” (presumably meaning that it could trigger a legislative response that is 
precipitous and ill thought out). And that was from our most sympathetic 
audience – even he was clear that the problem was the “quality of risk 
assessment and the monitoring and tracking procedures that apply in high risk 
cases”.  
 
As for the Daily Mail, the Mail Comment section on 15th March 2006 was 
appalled that no individuals involved in the Monckton case were disciplined as 
a result of the report, stating “public safety depends on probation and parole 
officials who seem bereft of any common sense”. There does seem to be a 
consensus in some quarters that practitioner’s errors have been scrutinised in 
extraordinary detail, in contrast to the organisations difficulties. As John 
Harding points out in his letter to the Guardian on 5th April 2006, “it is regretful 
that the Chief Inspector’s report on the Monckton killing ignores the staffing 
issues. The lessons are clear: good risk assessment and release planning of 
offenders must be predicated on a skilled workforce, sufficiently resourced and 
robust to meet the challenge of supervising dangerous offenders” 
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